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Abstract: Charles Beitz has presented us with a new and novel theory of human rights, one that is motivated by a concern for the enforcement of human rights in modern international practice. However, the focus on states in his human rights project generates a tension between the universal aspirations of individual human rights and the vulnerable individuals who through rendition or state failure find themselves outside the international state system. This paper argues that Beitz and other theorists of human rights make a mistake when they define human rights in statist terms. The scope of a theory of human rights must include all human beings, even if not simply in virtue of their humanity. The aspiration for human rights to be political and not metaphysical is interesting and admirable, but the human scope of human rights must be retained in order for human rights to retain their critical force.

Charles Beitz refers to his approach to human rights as a ‘practical’ or ‘functional’ approach to human rights​[1]​. This project mixes cosmopolitan commitments to universal human rights, and statist commitments to enforcing these human rights through existing institutions. In this paper, I argue that Beitz’s understanding of human rights is problematic for a reason related to the scope of a theory of human rights. Cosmopolitan and statist commitments are not incompatible per se, but where human beings and states do not coincide in scope, human rights ought to track the individual rather than the state. The universality of human rights is definitional, but Beitz’s theory of human rights may leave open the possibility that some human beings fall outside of the scope of his theory of human rights. Beitz’s theory implies that human rights track states directly, and individuals only derivatively. The problem becomes clear in the face of examples like failed states and rendition. Both are examples of individuals being vulnerable precisely because they fall outside of a state, and both are examples where a theory of human rights is urgently needed to play a critical role. Beitz’s theory struggles with these examples because of its unique link between human rights and state practice, or so I argue.
I Beitz and the Practical Conception of Human Rights
Beitz’s idea of a practical conception of human rights “takes the doctrine and practice of human rights as we find them in international political life as the source materials for constructing a conception of human rights”​[2]​. Beitz suggests that the full range of the practice itself – including its wide variety of functions in international political life – both defines and explicates the modern, normative concept of human rights. Beitz contends that once elucidated, this practical concept can be used in answering metaphysical questions about the content and authority of human rights. Where Rawls focuses on the coercive use of human rights as a justification for intervention, Beitz takes discursive practices such as public condemnation of human rights violators to be an essential defining function of modern human rights. 
The contrast between Beitz’s practical approach and the traditional naturalistic approaches to human rights is particularly sharp. Naturalistic theories suggest that human nature defines both the content and authority of human rights. Beitz’s focus on human rights as a social practice divorces the questions of authority and content from any account of human nature, and leaves the questions of authority and content to be dealt with at a later stage. Naturalistic theories use a minimal and therefore widely shareable concept of human nature to ground a universal authority for human rights. In contrast, Beitz argues that a widely shared practice entails universal authority for human rights, and that this allows for a broader scope for human rights. Naturalistic theories draw on resources such as natural law to determine the content of human rights. Beitz suggests that we determine the purposes of human rights as a first question, and follow this with an examination of which values can legitimately serve those purposes. Naturalistic theories of human rights are vulnerable to metaphysical disagreements about human nature. Beitz hopes that his theory, by focusing on human rights practice as it actually exists, can avoid these divisive disagreements.
Beitz points out that human rights have come to play a central normative role in liberal theories of international relations and moreover in the modern practice of international relations. Human rights serve a variety of functions in international relations, and Beitz proposes that we take these roles in international practice as the central defining feature of the modern incarnation of human rights. That is, we take the practice of human rights as the starting point for our examination of the normative pull of human rights. The result is a denial that human rights practices constitute merely relative values. Human rights construed as part of a social practice of international relations have objective normative pull. This normative pull is evidenced by the fact that disobeying human rights norms has consequences. These consequences may include damage to a state’s reputation, treaty relations, or opportunities for aid. If the international community respects human rights as though they were universally valid, then their independence of the social practice does not also need to be demonstrated. Taking the functions of human rights as fixed by modern practice elucidates both the debates surrounding human rights practice, and the content of the doctrine of human rights at the same time, or so Beitz contends.
Beitz suggests that human rights have become part of a global language of public reason, and moreover part of a practice of public justification. As Beitz explains, “if the public discourse of peacetime global society can be said to have a common moral language, it is that of human rights”​[3]​. Yet Beitz maintains that the power of human rights is in its practical applications. The modern language of human rights is used to publicly justify coercive practices such as interventions, to justify political and economic sanctions, and to explain some of the goals of humanitarian aid. All of these justificatory functions connect human rights ideals to the practices of international relations. Beitz points out that human rights have additionally been prerequisites for development assistance programs, justifications for non-military interventions, and have been formalized in various international financial regimes​[4]​. Finally, in all of these instances, human rights language serves the discursive functions of condemnation and praise. Human rights play an important discursive role in international public reason, and Beitz believes that this feature can and should be included as part of the ‘practice’ of human rights.
Drawing on twentieth century international human rights treaties, Beitz emphasizes that human rights are understood to protect urgent interests. He explains that their “object is to protect urgent individual interests against certain predictable dangers … to which [individuals] are vulnerable under typical circumstances of life in a modern world order composed of states”​[5]​. Beitz is taking the modern practice of human rights to define their content. The interests human rights protect are particularly urgent needs and vulnerabilities, so even if there are disputes over the precise content of human rights, the dispute is not over the type of content. 
Beitz proposes that these individual urgent interests be protected under what he calls a two-level model of human rights, wherein states are the primary bearers of responsibility for human rights, and the international community acts as guarantor that states fulfill their primary duties​[6]​. These two levels explain how human rights are to be enforced. At both levels, human rights are essentially addressed to states and state governments. At the first level, human rights are to be protected by states directly employing their coercive powers. Human rights are enforced at this stage by the normal coercive apparatus of the state. Legislation, police, and a judiciary will all play a role in enforcing human rights. 
But where a state fails to protect its citizens from human rights violations, or uses its coercive powers to violate human rights, the international community is called on to act. So, in the second instance, human rights are addressed to an international community of states, and to a different aspect of their coercive apparatus. He explains, “human rights are standards for domestic institutions whose satisfaction is a matter of international concern”​[7]​. The international concern may take the form of praise for successful human rights outcomes, or blame for human rights violations, and it may ultimately call on the international community to act through intervention. But at this second stage, just like the first level, states are called on to use their coercive power, this time to coercively apply pressure to another state in recognition of its failure to protect its own citizens’ human rights. 
Addressing states first in a theory of human rights is unusual, especially Beitz’s choice to address states both as domestic enforcers and explicit international enforcers. Moreover, accepting international human rights practice as the source material for a theory of human rights is a unique approach. Finally, accepting the merely discursive functions of human rights as constituting a significant portion of human rights practice is also noteworthy. These three issues of state focus, practice focus, and discursive function characterize the innovations of Beitz’s approach to human rights. 
II Cosmopolitan Commitments and a State Focused Theory
Beitz’s commitment to states as both the addressees and the enforcers of human rights is part of the novelty of his approach to human rights. It also provides a reply to the objection that human rights are merely aspirational because they cannot be enforced. In the modern practice of human rights, Beitz has shown that a form of enforcement is in place that sustains international human rights norms. Enforcement here is understood as including both incentives to comply with human rights norms and consequences for violations of human rights. On this model, human rights are enforced in virtue of the practical repercussions of both human rights achievements and failures. Attaching human rights prerequisites to international treaty memberships, revoking international treaty privileges in virtue of human rights failures, and doing both alongside monitoring of human rights compliance demonstrates a form of state-level enforcement of human rights that does not require international or supranational institutions. Beitz’s theory therefore does not commit to an additional global level of human rights enforcement such as a global police force or a global judiciary. This reply to the enforcement objection provides a justification and motivation for Beitz’s emphasis on states.
However, this same focus on states might undermine the universality of the human rights claim, and thereby undermine the critical power of human rights, and it is to that worry I turn next. The problem is all the more serious for Beitz because he aspires to include the discursive practice of criticism of human rights failures within the spectrum of human rights practice. Therefore, the types of wrongs that are typically labeled as egregious ‘human rights failures’ are particularly important to the theory, but they are also the type of marginal cases most likely to fall outside the scope of the theory. At the very least, Beitz’s use of statist commitments generates additional tension within the theory that threatens to undermine Beitz’s ability to describe human rights failure in particular.
My concern is that Beitz’s theory faces this tension because it addresses the theory of human rights to states. This tension is brought to light by thinking about the plight of stateless people. Although Beitz clearly defines human rights as universal, and aspires for human rights to be protected for every individual, his focus on states may nonetheless undermine this aspiration. The concern arises over the possibility of stateless persons, and moreover of states deliberately excluding persons so as to deny them access to human rights. 
States are clearly the addressees of Beitz’s conception of human rights. The naturalistic account of human rights achieves a universal commitment to individual human rights through its focus on human nature. In an ideal world, Beitz’s state-focused theory might achieve the same result given the universality and ubiquity of states. However, individual human beings are not necessarily attached to states, and the concern is that the scope of a state-focused account of human rights might not be wide enough. Beitz’s commitment to states seems at odds with the inherent individualism of human rights, and moreover to Beitz’s cosmopolitanism.
Two controversial examples of stateless people will illustrate the concern. The first is the example of the Guantanamo Bay prisoner, whose status as a member of a state has been removed. Whether such a prisoner chose to become stateless (by engaging in the activities of an ‘enemy combatant’) or whether the status was imposed on him (by the US military process) is irrelevant. The net result is that these prisoners are not recognized as subject to human rights conditions precisely because they are stateless. Perhaps the example demonstrates the descriptive adequacy of Beitz’s theory of human rights. The concern, nonetheless, is that Beitz’s theory of human rights cannot be used to criticize this practice, and so it fails in its normative aspirations. For Beitz’s theory of human rights, the Guantanamo Bay example demonstrates that by removing the connection between human beings and state institutions, we remove the entitlement of individuals to human rights and even the criticism of these practices as human rights violations. The direct link between states and human rights might therefore create a perverse incentive for states to find ways to sever the link between a particular individual or group of individuals and states in general, or states that respect human rights in particular. Although the practice of rendition has been widely condemned, in this light it becomes more understandable, if not forgivable.  
The second case is the example of the citizen of a failed state, whose rights cannot be protected by her own state, but nor is there a state to which the coercive apparatus of international pressure can be applied. In such cases, Beitz’s theory of human rights seems not to apply, even in the discursive sense that is central to Beitz’s account of human rights practice. There is no human rights failure because there is no state that could commit the violation. But there is also not human rights solution, given the type of actions and coercive resources Beitz uses to define human rights. 
Beitz seems to operate under the assumption that addressing human rights to states will result in universal human rights. Human rights are addressed in the first instance to states, and even the enforcement at the second level relies on states applying coercive pressure to other states. Beitz is committed to cosmopolitanism, which implies that he is committed to the universality of human rights. Yet, addressing human rights to states seems to undermine this commitment. In particular, it seems to undermine our ability to explain state failures in human rights terms. In that sense, Beitz’s human rights theory fails to protect the individuals who are most vulnerable. In cases of state failure, there is no longer a primary addressee of human rights discourse, nor is there an institutional apparatus to be coerced. In cases of rendition, an individual is explicitly removed from the protective aspects of state coercion. Given Beitz’s emphasis on the discursive practice of human rights, it’s not even clear whether the language of human rights can still be used to describe the situation of those in Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, or Guantanamo Bay. Accordingly, Beitz’s state focus undermines human rights discourse in precisely the cases where it is most needed. The problem is that Beitz’s theory of human rights tracks the wrong feature: it tracks states rather than persons.  
Beitz would likely reply by pointing out the pervasiveness of the state system. Even though some states may fail, the globe is still mapped out in state terms. We label failed ‘states’ and disputed territory with the language of the international state system, and we still designate the areas in question as ‘under the control’ of some state, or disputed by two or more states. My concern is, first, that the state system is not universal, and, second, that state coercion fails more readily than the language of states. In Beitz’s system, states are the addressees of human rights precisely because of the social contract link between statehood and the exclusive use of coercive force. And where either statehood or effective statehood fail, individuals become extremely vulnerable. 
Beitz wishes to avoid defining human rights as belonging to human beings qua human being, or in virtue of their humanness, because such definitions leave theorists of human rights mired in metaphysical debates about human nature. His aspiration to attach human rights to a political feature is therefore both understandable and quite admirable. It allows his theory of human rights to avoid a series of objections regarding tolerance and cultural imperialism. A minimal conception of a political value, in this case a definition of a state, can generate widespread agreement much more readily than a conception of the person. 
If the wrongs of genocide or torture turn out, in some instances of state failure, to fall outside the scope of a theory of human rights, it would not make them any less wrong. So, if some egregious wrongs fall outside the scope of Beitz’s theory of human rights, they would not be any less wrong for it. However, Beitz wants to maintain critical force for the language of human rights. While he would accept that some egregious wrongs are not human rights violations, he would not want to allow the same wrong to count as a human rights violation when it falls within certain geographic borders and not when it falls without. 
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